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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS
Celebrating our contributors:
Convocation, 2001
Note from the theological co-director: 
For eighteen years the Center for Christian Bioethics has operated with distinction because of the generosity of those
who support our work. Once again, we take note of this support and offer thanks. We appreciate those who donated to our
yearly operating budget. We appreciate those who volunteered their time and energy to conducting the work of the Center.
We appreciate those who built upon the endowments established that secure our future operations. 
In this issue we not only list our contributors for the year 2001, we also publish articles from two of our students currently
in the MA in biomedical and clinical ethics program. Both of these women have distinguished themselves within their fields
of dentistry and nursing and presented the following works at our most recent (November, 2001) annual Contributor’s
Convocation in Desert Palms. Georgina Manning, engaged in a combined degree program, addresses the care ethic from a
nursing background. Tricia Williams, a practicing dentist completing her comprehensive exams in the bioethics program,
uses her clinical experience and theoretical understanding of patient autonomy to find expression in her piece. 
The Center wishes to honor our contributors, encourage our students, and forward the work of Christian bioethics among
our constituency. 
Sincerely,
Mark F. Carr, PhD
Theological co-director
Center for Christian Bioethics
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Historical beginnings
Historically, many trace the beginnings of paternalism to the
Hippocratic Oath: “I will use treatment to help the sick accord-
ing to my ability and judgment, but I will never use it to injure
or wrong them” (Odom, 1991, p.12). Thus begins the
Hippocratic tradition of doing what one thinks is in the best
interest of the patient. This idea has gone on to be interpreted
in many ways. The paternalistic model is rooted in the best
interests of the patient, and the belief that doctors know best
how to protect these interests. 
In the United States, however, the emphasis on individual-
ity and self-determination has led the way to the dominance of
patient autonomy. A frontier spirit of individuality pervades
much of American culture. This sentiment is certainly not
localized to the United States, but also applies in other Western
countries.
Case law and historical events have helped shape atti-
tudes toward patient roles in health care. One of the earlier
cases that expresses the need for patient autonomy is
Schloendorff v. New York Hospital (1914). A woman went into
surgery for one procedure. While the patient was anes-
thetized the physician noticed a mole on the patient’s face
and removed it. The patient awoke from her anesthetic and
was quite displeased that the mole had been removed. A
lawsuit followed that challenged the
ideas of paternalism that were pervasive
at the time. Justice Cardozo in his opin-
ion on the case stated “…Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his
patient’s consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages”
(Schloendorff v. New York Hospital [1914]).
World War II brought about changes in
higher education and technology, as well
as a growing movement focused on civil
and individual rights. The atrocities of
human experimentation by the Nazi’s
precipitated a demand for proper respect
of patient autonomy and informed con-
sent. The Nuremberg Code, which sets forth
ethical principles of human experimenta-
tion, spells out very specifically these
demands: “The person involved should
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Today’s students of ethics are generally indoctrinated to
have an aversion to paternalism. Paternalism pervades many an
ethical discussion as a pejorative term, describing the promi-
nent doctor-knows-best model of patient interaction of decades
ago. Some refer to these times as the “good old days,” while
others describe patient autonomy as the best thing since sliced
bread. Medicine has undergone staggering changes in the last
thirty years that many would not have predicted. Shifts in how
health care is delivered have affected every aspect of medicine.
Dentistry on the other hand, seems to have lagged a bit behind.
It is my belief that dentistry, despite attempts to shift to the
patient autonomy model, has retained an inherently paternalis-
tic model of practice. Has dentistry, as a profession, thought
enough about paternalism in everyday practice? And are the
concepts of autonomy and paternalism adequately reflected in
the professional codes and clinical practice of dentists? I will
contend the answer to these questions is no; dentistry needs to
begin a dialogue within the profession about the responsibility
of dentists to recognize inherent paternalism in dentistry and
foster autonomy in patient decision making. In the face of such
changes, additionally, patient accountability must also be
encouraged, as they participate in their dental care.
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Paternalism and autonomy in dentistry
Tricia Williams, DDS
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have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to
be able to exercise free power of choice, without intervention
of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or
other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of
the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an under-
standing and enlightened decision.” Post World War II profes-
sional codes required alteration to include the emphasis on
patient autonomy. Despite the new found emphasis on patient
autonomy, use of the term informed consent does not enter the
mainstream of the health care lexicon until a decade later.
War further shaped attitudes toward self-determination and
propagated an expression of disdain for authority in the
Vietnam War era. Informed consent, as a term, only gains
prominence following the introduction of the Patients Bill of
Rights in the early 1970’s. The emergence of managed care has
further challenged the self-deter-
mination of patients and the
authority of doctors. A transforma-
tion in the doctor/patient relation-
ship has resulted. David C.
Thomasma, PhD, points out that
physicians and dentists, as a rule,
are no longer primary decision
makers in all aspects of health
care (1983). Recent attitudes
toward paternalism reflect the
frustrations of any dynamic sys-
tem. Paternalism survived cen-
turies as an acceptable pattern of
interaction. Then the changes in
attitude precipitated by case law and war forced attention on
individual rights, patient autonomy and informed consent.
Defining paternalism
It is important that we discuss the normative ethics of pater-
nalism in health care. We must define paternalism and explore
the implications of this in models of doctor/patient relation-
ships. This task is not as simple as one might think, because
there is not just one simple definition of paternalism.
Definitions of paternalism are riddled with qualifiers and sub-
tle variations that require explanation. Every author wants to
add an adjective to paternalism; for example, “justifiable pater-
nalism,” “strong paternalism,” “weak paternalism,” “benefi-
cent paternalism,” and “rational non-interventional
paternalism,” to name a few.
Gerald Dworkin, in his 1976 book, takes paternalism to
mean: “the interference with another’s liberty of action justi-
fied by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, hap-
piness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced.”
In some definitions of paternalism we merely see the principle
of beneficence take priority over the principle of autonomy.
This is the idea espoused by Albert R. Jonsen, PhD, et. al. in
their definition of paternalism: “the practice of overriding or
ignoring preferences of patients in order to benefit them or
enhance their welfare” (Jonsen et. al., 1982). In other words,
paternalism is not just coercing someone, it may simply be
ignoring the person’s expression of choice.
Dr. Thomasma (1983) states that paternalism does not
respect the rights of adults to self-determination, and that
autonomy does not respect the principle of beneficence. An
example, a seventy-year-old woman is found to have pancreatic
cancer. This woman has plans with her husband to take a trip
to her childhood home in Germany. She states to the physician
that she has plans and hopes he has no bad news. A strong
paternalistic response might favor beneficent deception over
truthtelling. Conjecture about
potential detriment could eclipse
the moral duty to tell the truth.
The desired outcome would be
to not ruin what could be the
patient’s final trip.
Paternalism, as defined by
James F. Childress, PhD, (1982),
is an action taken by one person
in the best interests of another
without their consent. He
addresses two features of pater-
nalism. The primary feature is
the “altruistic beneficence,”
which aims to benefit another
person. The second characteristic is a refusal to accept that per-
son’s wishes, choices, and actions in certain circumstances.
Paternalism may then be defined as a refusal to accept,
acquiesce in, or even attend to another person’s wishes,
choices, and actions because they are not deemed to be in the
best interests of that person.
As one can see there are varied explanations of what
paternalism means. However, for our purposes I will define
paternalism as: the actions taken by health-care professionals
when they believe they know what is best for the patient,
regardless of the expressed will of the patient. In the dental
setting, paternalism often takes the form, not of overriding
the expressed will of a patient, but of failing even to ask the
will of the patient. If anything was learned from Schloendorff
v. New York Hospital it is that health-care professionals must
ask patients to express their will.
Please turn to page 4
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“...paternalism often
takes the form, not of
overriding the
expressed will of the
patient, but of failing
even to ask the will of
the patient.”
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Among the assorted definitions of paternalism, the dynam-
ics of the doctor/patient relationship take on characteristics
with subtle variations. It would be beneficial to explore briefly
the models of doctor/patient relationships to illuminate the
possible nuances these relationships provide.
Models of doctor/patient relationships
Attitudes of the doctor/patient relationship are framed by
the implicit model in which the two interact. A review of the
literature reveals dozens of models and many are redundant.
All attempt to describe the relationship between doctor and
patient, as well as between the doctor and his profession. The
author who has set forth the most familiar models of
doctor/patient relationships in dentistry is David T. Ozar, PhD,
and I will limit our discussion to his models.
Dr. Ozar identifies four models as the most pertinent to eth-
ical discussion in dentistry (1994): Guild Model, Agent Model,
Commercial Model and Interactive Model. 
The Guild Model focuses on the doctor’s expertise and the
patient’s lack of it. The source of expertise is the profession, a
community of doctors who preserve and advance knowledge.
By definition, a guild is an organization of persons with related
interests, goals, etc., especially formed for mutual aid or self-
protection. A guild is organized to maintain standards and to
protect the interests of its members; a guild sometimes consti-
tutes a local governing body. It is because of the doctors’ com-
mitment to the profession that they undertake professional
obligations. There are two morally problematic components to
this model. Implicit in this model is the doctor’s primary alle-
giance to the profession. Disharmony occurs when the doctor’s
first allegiance (the profession) comes in conflict with meeting
the needs of the patient. Secondly, the patient is not viewed as
an autonomous figure, because only the doctor has the exper-
tise to judge patient needs. Ideals of respecting patient auton-
omy and acting in patients’ best interests take second and third
place to professional allegiance.
If decision making is entirely left to to the patient, it would
be categorized as the Agent Model. In this model the doctor
only acts as an “agent” for the patient. Although this model has
an autonomous role for the patient to play it does not create a
favorable role for the doctor. The doctor’s knowledge is all that
is required from the patient. There is no desire in this model
for a caring interactive relationship, the doctor must only
respond to the wishes of the patient. One could liken the role
of the doctor in this model to that of a waiter. The patient
places his order and the doctor does his bidding. The Agent
Model is not likely to serve as a useful scenario in the world of
health care. It places the “ethical commitments” of a health-
Paternalism and autonomy in dentistry, continued… care professional at risk. Professional commitment to the wel-
fare of the patient does not guide this relationship.
The doctor in the Commercial Model is reduced to merely
a producer of goods. The ethics of commercialism do not bind
the doctor to any high moral standard. The concept of profes-
sional is lost in this model. The doctor is not bound by his com-
mitment to the profession or to the patients to act in their best
interest. In this model the patient is reduced to the status of a
customer or client. The goal of the doctor is to sell or service. A
doctor/patient relationship based on this model seeks rewards
of a financial kind. The patient (consumer) wants a good prod-
uct at a low price. The doctor wants to provide that product and
gain a profit. This model does not focus on patient needs, com-
mitment or whole-person care.
Assumption of the Interactive Model considers the patient
to be a decision maker, but also as a sick person in need of care.
There are three important aspects of equality in this model.
One, doctor and patient have equal standing as decision mak-
ers and both deserve respect. Two, each is trying to live by a set
of values. Three, decisions about the patient’s health are facili-
tated by communication and mutual cooperation. In the
Interactive Model the sick patient seeks out the expertise the
doctor possesses in hopes of restoring health. As such, auton-
omy is respected. The doctor respects the body of the patient,
seeking to aid in the return of control and health to the
patient. The Interactive Model favors collaboration. This col-
laboration commits the doctor to working to enhance the
patient’s autonomy.
These models give us a sense of the range in doctor/patient
relationships. However, these are theoretical constructs and no
dentist or patient fits exactly into any one model. It is impor-
tant for dentists to locate themselves in this range of models,
and realize doctor/patient interaction will differ greatly from
case to case. A number of variables influence the spectrum of
doctor/patient relationships. Variables such as age, culture, gen-
der, and education often effect how treatment decisions are
presented and made.
Building on Dr. Ozar’s insights, I propose a model that could
be normative for dentistry. From the perspective of one who
practices clinical dentistry, I contend that a model should have
some of the following characteristics. The dentist should
acknowledge the patient as a potential decision maker, but
realize that not all patients will attempt to participate in deci-
sions. We should recognize that equality of power does not nat-
urally exist in the doctor/patient relationships, largely due to
the variables mentioned above. It is important to foster com-
munication and mutual cooperation in decisions about the
patient’s health, however this cannot occur unless there is an
effort made by both parties. The patient’s effort should include
desire and ability to attain, comprehend, and process pertinent
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treatment information. Doctors must ask, inform, and listen to
patients and not accept silence as a tacit consent. True collabo-
ration between doctor and patient requires active participation
from both. Interaction is not enough. Doctors must seek 
to ascertain the expressed will of the patient. I will call this
model the Active Participation Model of Doctor/Patient
Relationships. The Active Participation Model will have chal-
lenges and implications in clinical practice. However, it is an
ideal for which we must strive as a profession.
Dental practice realities
American society is inundated with information about med-
icine. There are newspaper and magazine articles, web sites,
special segments on the nightly news, and one hour dramas
like ER and Chicago Hope. Patients are exposed to medical ter-
minology and information in ways unlike 50 or even 30 years
ago. This increase in the patient’s medical information “IQ”
has helped to foster the focus on autonomy and self-determi-
nation. Patients expect information from their physician, and
many expect the physician to involve them in decision making.
In my experience, dental patients do not attempt this same
level of active interaction. There is no television drama that
chronicles the experiences of dentists in action. Many patients
do not know, or care to know, the particulars of their dental
treatment. The explanation for this is simple: for the patient,
medical decision making is different from dental decision mak-
ing. In medical decision making, the patient often has to decide
whether to have a particular procedure done or not. The med-
ical decision often does not involve a selection of procedures to
do. Moreover, medical decisions often feel compelling because
of the gravity of what is at stake, including, at times, life itself.
In contrast, in dentistry, there are seldom life and death
issues. So dental decisions often become more like buying a
new car or other commodities. What options and features
should the patient choose? How much can he or she afford?
And how can the treatment be financed? Simplified further,
often the primary concerns of dental patients could be broken
down into these two questions. First, how much is this going to
hurt? Second, how much is this going to cost? Other informa-
tion is often viewed as superfluous technical jargon, not perti-
nent to decision making. 
Mae, a 63-year-old grandmother, waitress and 50 pack-a-
year smoker, was treated in my practice. She is a good illustra-
tion of patient indifference to active decision making. She
presented with poor oral health, a case of neglect. I carefully
documented the clinical findings of periodontal disease and
caries. We discussed the negative effects of years of smoking
and neglect on her dental health and how we might arrest the
disease process. Mae listened intently as I described oral
pathogens, materials, techniques, treatment benefits, and con-
traindications. Her response at the end of my discourse on den-
tal treatment materials and modalities was not to participate
actively and engage me with questions. Her reply was simply,
“Whatever you think is best dear. I know you’ll choose what’s
best for me.” I would like to say this was an isolated event, but
I cannot. Many dental patients do not actively participate in
attempts to educate and inform.
Disclosure of information to dental patients is not a simple
task. David Nash states in his Journal of the American Dental
Association article, that the dentist is obligated to disclose all
the information a rational person would desire to know in
arriving at a decision, but must do so in a manner that ensures
patient comprehension (1984). This is accomplished by pro-
cessing the information in a reciprocal manner—asking for a
patient validation of understanding and requesting and
responding to questions. The information desired by a ratio-
nal person can be correlated with how important the person
believes a decision is. If making a decision is related to a med-
ical problem of life and death proportion, then often times
more information is desired. That, however, does not mean
an expression of autonomy is necessarily more important if
life is at stake. Respect for a person’s expression of will
extends to large and small matters in life.
In the simplest of terms, I observe two kinds of dental
patients who seek care. First, there are patients who are con-
cerned about their teeth and want to maintain dental health.
Second, there are patients concerned about their teeth only
when they hurt. The first group contains within it patients
desiring different amounts of information. However, there is a
baseline of information needed to accommodate this group.
The second group often requires the most treatment, but also
(with rare exception), desires the least information. These
patients are often more likely to let cost dictate their dental
treatment. The situation is obviously disproportionate and a
source of frustration to the dentist seeking to adequately
inform the patient. Literature often instructs that the dentist
can gain the patient’s consent only after the opportunity to
freely and intelligently consider the options (Nash, 1984). This
type of communication is a challenge in dentistry, and what
should exist as the standard of informed consent. Such a stan-
dard of informed consent is imperative if we are to implement
the Active Participation Model.
The care of Mr. Casson illustrates this challenge. He was a
75-year-old patient in need of a great deal of dental work. He
was missing multiple posterior teeth and needed restoration
of function. A comprehensive treatment plan was constructed
with multiple treatment options and presented to him.
Please turn to page 6
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Attempts to inform him in common language about the indi-
cations, risk and benefits, mechanics, and cost of his options
were admirably carried out by the dentist. The patient did
not respond in a “reciprocal manner” (Nash, 1984) and obvi-
ously lacked a desire to comprehend his treatment plan. He
was not incompetent. He was just not interested. This sce-
nario plays itself out in varied forms in dental offices, every-
where, everyday.
The paternalistic model of patient interaction in dentistry is
often expected by a patient. Pellegrino argues that, when prop-
erly used in a caring effort to enhance individual autonomy by
educating patients, the paternalistic model is praiseworthy and
responsible (1988). Is it possible that much of decision making
in dentistry is justifiable paternalism? If so, patients may be
more inclined to let someone else decide what to do, particu-
larly if they trust their caregivers to do what is best. However,
this attitude is not ideal. We should ask patients to express their
will. Our goal should be to obtain truly informed consent. To
obtain the ideals of the Active Participation Model we must see
change both in doctors and in patients. Paternalistic practice is
often perpetuated by the apathy and complacency of patients
regarding the particulars of the dental care, but individual den-
tists and organized dentistry must precipitate change. If we fail
to do this it is likely the legal system will do it for us. 
Recent events reflect the need for change in dentistry. A
complaint was filed in Los Angeles against the American
Dental Association (ADA) and California Dental Association
by an organization called Kids Against Pollution. This suit
claims that amalgam is harmful and that mercury should no
longer be used in dentistry. The complaint rehashes arguments
about dental materials that are not new to dentistry. However,
the existence of such a suit is fundamentally troubling and per-
tinent to our discussion. Patients must be informed and con-
sent to treatment acquired. This consent includes what kind of
materials are placed in a patient’s mouth. The ADA’s response
to this suit in a news release states “the ADA has long held the
view that dentists should not induce patients to accept dental
treatment by using misleading information or information not
based on the best scientific evidence. That’s what the ADA’s
ethics rule is all about—protecting patients” (ADA News
Release, June 2001).
The ADA Principles of Ethics and Code of Professional
Conduct address the principle of patient autonomy. Section I
states, “The dentist has a duty to respect the patient’s right to
self-determination and confidentiality.” This principle is fur-
ther discussed, as the ADA states: “Under this principle, the
dentist’s primary obligations include involving patients in treat-
ment in a meaningful way, with due consideration being given
to the patient’s needs, desires and abilities, and safeguarding
the patient’s privacy.” Section 1.A. directly addresses patient
involvement. “The dentist should inform the patient of the
proposed treatment, and any reasonable alternatives, in a man-
ner that allows the patient to become involved in treatment
decisions.” The language in the professional code is crafted to
retain some semblance of paternalism. In the absence of inter-
pretive statements or case law the principles are vague. Phrases
such as “to become involved” sound like an invitation for a
patient to join in. Not exactly words that speak of active partic-
ipation. The idea of presenting any reasonable alternatives is
subject to some confusion as well. What is considered reason-
able by one dentist may not be so for another.
There is a great spectrum of reasonable alternatives influ-
enced by many factors, not the least of which is financial. A
good example would be the treatment options available for a
patient with a missing tooth. The spectrum would include a
removable appliance, fixed bridge or dental implant. However,
sometimes paternalistic attitudes influence the situation and a
patient may only be offered the first two treatment options. Yet,
as implants increasingly become the standard of care, dentists
could be held legally responsible for not adequately informing
a patient. The ADA should address these ambiguities in the
professional code and strive to place a greater emphasis on
informed consent and furthering patient autonomy.
Practice ideals
There is no question that doctors should aspire to practice
their profession morally. However, questions do arise about
how to accomplish moral practice. The ethics of the profession
derive from the role assumed by the doctor in agreeing to enter
into a relationship with another human to “do good” for the
individual with regard to health (Nash, 1984). William F. May,
PhD, seeks to encapsulate the relationship entered into by pro-
fessional and patient by describing this relationship as a
covenant. This covenantal relationship is entered into by doc-
tor and patient. However, the covenant goes beyond the doc-
tor/patient relationship and extends to include the profession
and society (1983). A covenantal relationship implies that the
duties of the doctor apply beyond the patients they directly
interact with and extend to the whole of society.
An obligation of this kind could be a bit overwhelming. It is
worthwhile to explore why the profession has a covenant with
society. Society provides the bequest of education and self-
government in return for the professional’s inherent talents and
abilities. Society promises the health professional that it will
grant self-governance and opportunity for personal gain. The
profession, in turn, promises to serve society fairly and faith-
fully. Consequently, professionals become doctors and individ-
uals of society patients. “The health professional is
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transformed from ordinary citizen to healer” (Nash, 1984).
Each time a doctor and patient establish a relationship this
covenant is reconfirmed.
Once the relationship is established the doctor begins to
pursue the goal of the relationship, beneficence, doing good.
Benefiting the patient is accomplished by providing the best
care possible. It is necessary to take into account the clinical
circumstances: patient understanding, the profession’s cur-
rent understanding, and the patient’s desires. It is critical to
recognize patient vulnerability. There is an imbalance due to
the technical training of a doctor that must be balanced by
conveying sufficient information to the patient. Because of
the doctor’s expertise he or she must take initiative in con-
trolling the imbalance of the relationship. The attempt to
inform or educate the patient is demonstrated in Dr. Ozar’s
Interactive Model and in my proposal for an Active
Participation Model. In order to precipitate change and aspire
to the Active Participation Model we must lobby for a change
in our colleagues, the attitudes of our patients and in orga-
nized dentistry. Our ultimate goal in doctor/patient relation-
ships should be to treat disease while upholding the
principles of patient autonomy and informed consent.
Practice solutions and conclusions
Many dentists find the indifference of patients to treatment
decisions as repugnant as many ethicists find paternalism. The
question is: What can be done to change the existing perva-
siveness of paternalism in dental practice? There is little open
opposition to the conversion of dentistry to autonomy models.
Dentists are motivated to embrace a practice philosophy that
would encourage patient participation and self-determination.
There are altruistic motivations as well as numerous benefits to
the dentist. Patients who understand what their dental treat-
ment entails are far more likely to appreciate their dentist’s
skills. It is important when a dentist leaves the office in the
evening that he or she feels good about what has been accom-
plished. The value of patient appreciation for dental skills is
inherent to the autonomy model. The value of a well-informed
and educated patient is significant. Patients who comprehend
treatment options will value quality and seek more compre-
hensive treatment. This will result in benefit to the patient as
well as the dentist.
Dentistry sits on a great precipice, positioned for change.
The historical progress of thought through world events and
changes in public policy have helped precipitate new models
of doctor/patient relationships. Emphasis has gradually shifted
from paternalistic attitudes of doctors toward patient self-
determination and autonomy. This shift has served as a water-
shed for dialogue and codification of appropriate models of doc-
tor/patient relationships. However, more must be done.
Organized dentistry should strive to make stronger and clearer
statements in the Code of Professional Conduct about
informed consent and patient autonomy. Dentists and patients
should seek active participation in treatment planning. In clin-
ical practice, we, as dentists, should never be guilty of not ask-
ing a patient their express will in dental treatment.
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In the search for new ways of providing care and meeting
the needs of patients, medicine and technology have sur-
passed their original intentions. Technological advances are
now keeping children alive while their quality of life and
severity of their disabilities are turning into an existence con-
sumed by suffering.10 As a result, nurses are confronted more
and more with ethical dilemmas. Some of these ethical dilem-
mas include life and death issues regarding uncertainty, the
initiation and/or removal of life support, selection or exclusion
as a potential recipient of an organ transplant or administering
an experimental drug to a child who is too young to give
informed consent.6
Chris Gastmans, PhD, Bernadette Dierckx de Casterle,
PhD, and Paul Schotmans, PhD9, describe the moral practice
of nursing as providing good care. Drs. Gastmans, Dierckx de
Casterle, and Schotmans contend that care can be considered
a foundational normative concept in the ethics of the nursing
profession. 
Ethics & nursing
Tom L. Beauchamp, PhD, and James F. Childress, PhD,
describe ethics as a “generic term for various ways of under-
standing and examining the moral life.”2 There are, at least,
two approaches to ethics, normative and nonnormative.
Normative ethics is described as a “form of inquiry that
attempts to answer the question ‘which general moral norms
of the guidance and evaluation of conduct should we accept
and why?’”2—that is, to identify the general moral norms of
nursing practice used to guide and evaluate the conduct of
nursing and their relation to care ethics.
The tradition of nursing is traced back to the Victorian era
during Florence Nightingale’s revival of altruistic nursing and
the covenant of care. The covenant of care, as stated by Ann
Bradshaw, “arose from Judaeo-Christian imperative of care for
the stranger, agape, as exemplified in the story of the Good
Samaritan.”4 Traditionally, the purpose of nursing was caring
for the sick. Although health care has changed over the last
one hundred years, the moral tradition of altruisim remains
fundamental to the nursing profession.
Nursing, as a moral practice, is based on the obligation of
promoting the well-being of patients by means of a caring rela-
tionship.5 Drs. Gastmans, Dierckx de Casterle, and Schotmans
describe nursing practice as the “totality of skills and attitudes
(caring behavior) that are applied in the context of a particular
caring relationship, with the intention of providing good care
(the goal) to the (usually sick) fellow person.”9 Nursing, as a
moral practice, consists of three main components: the caring
relationship, caring behavior and good care. The caring rela-
tionship consists of the relationship between the nurse and
patient. Caring behavior involves the integration of virtue and
expert activity of nursing practice. The goal of nursing is to
promote the well-being of the patient by providing good care
on all levels, including physical, psychological, relational,
social, moral and spiritual.9
Caring, caring relationships and caring behaviors
Caring is defined as a “behavior or set of behaviors that
stem from a strong opinion, feeling, concern, or interest in
something or someone that contributes to the good worth, dig-
nity or comfort of someone.”8 In nursing, the caring relation-
ship is a professional one that originates from a situation where
one individual is in need of caring, as a result from an illness,
crisis or the inability to care for himself or herself.7 From this
perspective, the caring relationship is “a way of relating one-
self to the other in relational context with focus on develop-
ment and maintenance of the other and oneself.”9 In nursing,
the caring relationship not only includes the patient, but the
entire family. Parents, siblings, and grandparents are also in
need of caring during times of illness or crisis. Therefore, in
pediatric nursing, caring not only relates to the child, but to
the family in a relational context, focusing on the develop-
ment and maintenance of the child, family and nurse.
Caring is carried out through behaviors that involve the
integration of virtue and expert activity of nursing practice.9
The virtue of care can help nurses reach the goal of good care.
The virtue of care is described as having two dimensions, cog-
nitive and affective. The cognitive dimension involves knowl-
edge of the situation of the person in need, while the
affective-motivational involves being emotionally touched
and motivated by what happens to the patient.9 The virtue of
care is concerned with the factual, concrete condition of the
individual. From the cognitive dimension, the pediatric nurse
should be knowledgeable of the situation of the person in
need. For example, a nurse caring for a child who was involved
in an automobile accident would need to be knowledgeable
about the injury to the child, the age and developmental stage
of the child, medical history, whereabouts of parents and fam-
ily members, and others involved in the accident. The affec-
tive-motivational dimension includes the response to the
event (a child in need of care) resulting in a motivation to pro-
vide good nursing care to the patient and family. Hence, the
cognitive and affective dimensions of the virtue of care are not
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separate components, rather they inform one another.9
The expert activity of nursing that relates to caring behav-
iors can best be described by the work of Patricia Benner,
PhD, RN, From Novice to Expert.3 In her work, Dr. Benner
identified seven domains and competencies of nursing prac-
tice. In nursing practice, the domains of the Helping Role and
Teaching-Coaching Function specifically focus on the nurse-
patient relationship. 
The Helping Role focuses on establishing a relationship
with the patient and establishing a commitment to healing.
The competencies in this domain focus on comfort, support,
communication, and preservation of personhood. In pediatric
critical care nursing this would include establishing a relation-
ship with the patient and family in order to provide comfort,
support, and to foster communication between the nurse,
patient, and family. By doing so, the pediatric critical care
nurse is able to guide the patient and family through recovery
and emotional and developmental changes. The teaching-
coaching function focuses on the patient and his/her illness. In
this domain, competencies include the understanding and
integrating of illness and recovery into the patients and family
lifestyle.
The competencies and behaviors identified by Dr. Benner
are similar to the caring behaviors identified by Sara T. Fry,
PhD, RN; Aileen R. Killen, PhD, RN; and Ellen M.
Robinson, PhD, RN.8 In the article, Drs. Fry, Killen, and
Robinson discuss aspects of caring nurse behaviors based on
responses from patients, nurses and the general public.
Results were obtained through the analysis and synthesis of
nine research studies on caring. Based on their findings, Dr.
Robinson conducted a new analysis of nine other studies and
identified twenty-six aspects of caring nursing behaviors. 
When combined, the authors presented a preliminary list of
eleven identified aspects of caring behaviors. These include
empathic communication, presence, competence, trusting
relationship, meeting patient needs, respect, providing conti-
nuity of care, advocating and being nonjudgmental and solici-
tous. Although the list is preliminary, interestingly, the
domains and competencies identified are similar to those
noted by Dr. Benner. Therefore one can conclude that the
expert activity of nursing and the virtue of care can best be
demonstrated though caring behaviors.
The third component of the moral practice of nursing is
good care. The goal of good care is promoting the well-being
of the patient on all levels—physical, relational, social, psy-
chological, moral, and spiritual. Good care in the physical
aspect includes maintaining and improving the patient’s phys-
ical condition. Not only does this include maintenance and
promotion of the body, as in feeding and bathing, but the
respect for the human body, privacy and dignity.8 Respect, pri-
vacy and dignity for the human body requires that the nurse
respect the physical condition of the patient at all times. In
pediatric nursing, it is important for the nurse to respect the
human body, even in the midst of medical emergencies, treat-
ments, and procedures, which require a child’s body to be
exposed.
The relational aspect focuses on promoting the develop-
ment of “more profound human contact.”8 Dr. Gastmans, et.
al., states that good care must promote the person in his or her
relational dimension. This includes planning and promoting
human contact. In pediatric nursing, this includes allowing
families to remain at the bedside with their child and/or sched-
uling visiting times for families and friends. Involving the fam-
ily in the care of the child not only promotes human contact,
but encourages the relationship between parent and child.
The pediatric nurse, through touching such as in rocking or
holding the child, can also promote human contact.
The social dimension involves social institutions, organiza-
tions and societies that relate to the patient.8 Dr. Gastmans, et.
al. describes the health-care system as an example of a social
institution. In the health-care system, the nurse functions as
an advocate for the patient and their family. This involves pro-
tecting or affirming the rights of the patient within the health-
care system or the hospital setting. 
In pediatrics, many patients are not able to exercise their
power of self-determination; therefore the nurse may assume
the role of advocate. Advocacy in pediatric nursing may
require the nurse to speak on behalf of the patient. As an advo-
cate, this includes respecting the autonomy and integrity of
the patient and family, and protecting the child from harm.6
Dr. Gastmans, et. al. states that the nurse must also focus her
attention to and advocate for those in greatest need and whose
access to health care is difficult.
The psychological dimension calls for the nurse to protect
the uniqueness and originality of every patient.9 This is
demonstrated by respecting the individuals for who they are.
The nurse can only advocate for the patient if the nurse under-
stands what the meaning of life is or could be for the patient.
In pediatric nursing, this involves understanding what is
important for the patient, as well as, his or her family. Respect
for the patient and family’s culture, values, beliefs, and assist-
ing the patient and family in fulfilling their moral obligations.
The moral dimension involves appreciating the patient as a
moral subject and focuses on the patients’ self-determination.
This involves respecting the autonomy of the patient, allow-
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ing the patient to make his or her own decisions, the right to
be informed of choices and to be free from coercion. Pediatric
patients will lack life experiences and knowledge to exercise
their own decision-making. Therefore the nurse must provide
the opportunity and necessary information for families to
make decisions about their child.6
In regards to the spiritual dimension, good care requires the
nurse to respect the patients’ spiritual needs and to assist in his
or her fulfillment. 
In summary, caring relationships, caring behaviors and good
care hold a common theme—respect and caring for the
patient. Therefore, in the moral practice of nursing, respect
and caring are the generally accepted moral norms guiding and
evaluating the conduct of nursing practice. Bridghid Kelly11
presents the concepts of respect, caring and nursing, and their
relationship in the following
eight propositions:
The practice of nursing 
is essentially moral in nature.
Respect for persons and caring
are ethics in nursing. Respect as 
a nursing ethic, is evidenced 
by respect for clients and fami-
lies, self, colleagues, and the 
profession.
Caring as a nursing ethic, is
evidenced by caring for clients
and families, self, colleagues, and
the profession. Respect and car-
ing are necessary but not sufficient elements in nursing.
Respect precedes caring in the nurse client relationship. In the
absence of respect, caring cannot take place. In the absence of
caring, nursing does not take place (p. 73).
Respect for the person is necessary for the caring relation-
ship to take place and both the nurse and patient must see and
treat each other as equals. In pediatric nursing, although the
nurse and patient may not view themselves as equals, as in the
case of an infant or critically ill child, the nurse and family
must see and treat each other as equals. Having identified the
moral norms of nursing practice, I will now discuss care ethics
as an ethical foundation in pediatric critical care nursing.
Care ethics in pediatric critical care nursing
“Ethical decision making is central to every nursing act.
Decision-making grounded in ethics is not a particular mode
of reasoning to which one refers in certain situations. It is an
element of nursing.”11
“Ethical behavior is not the display of one’s moral rectitude
in times of crisis. It is the day by day expression of one’s com-
mitment to other persons and the ways in which human
beings relate to one another in their daily interactions.”11
An ethics of care values the personal relationships of the
individuals involved. The moral responsibility and possible
choices are defined by the context of the relationship. The
process involves identifying the problem within its context,
considering others involved, and how they are interrelated,
feeling concern for individuals and relationships through sym-
pathy, compassion or friendship, and identifying oneself in
relation to the individuals and problems involved.8 Drs.
Gastmans, Dierckx de Casterle, and Schotmans9 state that the
ethical task of nursing consists of fostering the caring relation-
ship to progress as much as possible toward the moral good
understood as good care. Having established respect and care
as moral norms of nursing practice, and the definition of care
ethics, I propose care ethics as an
ethical foundation for pediatric
critical care nursing. 
Opponents of care ethics as an
ethical theory argue that care
ethics is incomplete, lacks com-
prehensiveness, explanatory and
justificatory power, is oppressive
to women, requires one to act
partially, and rejects traditional
moral principles of justice and
impartiality.2 It is through a
reflective narrative of personal
experience that I will bring to
light the full capacity of care ethics in resolving ethical dilem-
mas, such as ones of removal of life support, and the day-by-
day expression of nursing’s commitment to other persons. 
Joel was a 2-year-old boy who was diagnosed with Non-
Hodgkin’s Lymphoma at 18 months of age. As a staff nurse for
a pediatric unit, I was Joel’s primary nurse. Over the course of
eight months, I took care of Joel and his family. I grew to know
Joel’s mother, father, grandparents, aunts and uncles. Joel was
in the hospital for weeks at a time, sometimes not being able
to go outside or run around like most toddlers do at this age.
During the late hours of the night, Joel and I would have water
gun fights with syringes, practice counting, saying the alpha-
bet, and playing baseball with a hand towel rolled up and our
hands as bats. My relationship with Joel and his family was
one that flourished out of the respect for Joel and his family.
Joel’s parents were very loving and supportive, and wanted
everything done for him, for he was their only child. After six
months of treatment, it was evident that Joel was not respond-
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ing to treatment and that his condition was worsening. Joel’s
physician wanted to try more aggressive treatment and did not
want to give up. As I transferred to work on the pediatric
intensive care unit, so did Joel. At this point he was intubated,
receiving continuos blood transfusions, dialysis, and cardiac
support drugs. It was 1:15 p.m. when Joel’s heart stopped beat-
ing and cardiopulmonary resuscitation was initiated. While the
doctor was yelling out orders, I was pushing blood and other
fluids in hope of maintaining a blood pressure. During this
time the parents were asked to step outside. After thirty min-
utes of coding Joel, it was evident that Joel would not be
revived. As an advocate for Joel, and out of respect for him and
his family, I asked the physician to terminate the code. At 1:55
p.m. the code was terminated and at 2:00 p.m. Joel died.
Looking back, I ask myself what made me ask for termination
of the code? Respect and caring. 
Nursing, as a moral practice, is based on the moral obliga-
tion of promoting the well-being of the patient by means of
a caring relationship. Caring relationships are maintained
through respect and caring. The only way I could promote
the well-being of Joel and his family was by terminating the
procedures and medications that were prolonging his life as
well as the suffering that came along with it. Continuing life
support and prolonging his life would not promote the well-
being of Joel and his family, rather, it would go against my
moral obligation. 
It was through respect for the human body and dignity
that I asked for his body to be left alone. And it was the same
respect that provided the strength to clean his body before
his mother and father could come in and see him. It was
through the holding of his hand and his mother’s while he
was dying, that promoted the human contact. It was empathy
that allowed me to cry alongside his mother, as she held him
one last time. Having knowledge of his situation, under-
standing what life meant to Joel and his family and respect-
ing his family’s culture, values, and beliefs, allowed me to act
as an advocate. As an advocate, I was able to protect him from
further harm. 
By identifying the problem within its context (terminally ill
child), considering others involved (parents, grandparents,
aunts, and uncles) and how they interrelate, and feeling con-
cern for Joel and his family through sympathy and compassion,
I was able to identify myself in relation to Joel, his family, and
his illness. It was through care ethics that I was able to fulfill
my moral obligation in promoting the well-being of Joel and
his family. In this case, Joel and his family’s well-being
involved allowing him to die. The care and respect between
the nurse, patient, and family is subjective and varies with
each individual, and therefore cannot be limited by rules or
principles. If critics of the care ethic are correct, perhaps this is
where care ethics lacks completeness, comprehensiveness,
and impartiality in that it fails to capture the full dynamics of
such complex and intimate relationships. 
In conclusion, nursing as a moral practice is based on the
moral obligation of promoting the well-being of patients by
means of a caring relationship. The caring relationship pro-
vides a foundation for ethical decision making and a place for
care ethics in pediatric critical care nursing. 
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